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1 
1. Introduction 
Today it is not controversial to claim that most vertebrates are sentient beings . To claim that we                 1
have moral obligations towards all such sentient beings is perhaps more controversial. To be              
sentient is to be able to have positive or negative experiences. A crucial ability for moral status is                  
whether a being is capable of suffering. This is because suffering is intrinsically bad and               
well-being is intrinsically good. The fundamental starting point for this text rests on a              
sentiocentric  view.  2
Most people would agree that pain is bad and that we have reason to alleviate another person’s                 
pain if possible. A closer look at nature shows how suffering is ubiquitous through predation,               
starvation, exposure, parasitism etc. Considering this, the question of whether we should            
intervene and try to prevent this suffering is not as farfetched as one might think. Yet the idea of                   
intervening in nature on moral grounds, with the aim of trying to prevent and minimize the                
overall and substantial amount of suffering present, remains highly controversial and has not             
received much interest. However, in more recent years, the question has caught the attention of               
certain philosophers. Some of these argue that we have an obligation to prevent suffering in               
nature and some claim that we do not. The different views on this topic can, somewhat crudely,                 
be divided into three groups:  
1. We have moral obligations towards non-humans animals regardless of whether  
they live within human confinement or in the wild. 
2. We ought to consider domesticated and other animals that live within human            
confinement, but not wild ones.  
3. We do not have moral obligations towards animals at all.  
From the idea that animals have moral status and anti-speciesist reasoning there is a strong               
inference to the idea that we ought to prevent suffering in the wild when possible. For example,                 
if one accepts that we should not maltreat and kill domesticated animals for the consumption of                
meat because the well-being of these animals matters morally, then one should have little issues               3
with accepting that the well-being of animals in the wild also matters morally.  
A particularly difficult issue to tackle, regarding wild animal suffering, is that of predation.              
There are many other reasons for the suffering of animals in the wild such as starvation, disease,                 
parasitism etc., but predation, as we will see later in the text, poses a particular problem.                
1 This has been declared by The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness  
2 Sentiocentrism or Sentientism is the view that sentient beings are morally important in their own.  
3 Many are becoming aware of the suffering factory farming causes domesticated animals and realize it is 
wrong. However, it is not only the production meat that causes suffering to animals, many other industries 
such as egg, dairy, cosmetic etc. are also causing disvalue.  
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However, in the other cases, if there are effective and relatively inexpensive ways to help               4
animals suffering from these conditions, then ought we not to administer such help?  
Common objections to aiding wild animals focus on the practical problems. However, what this              
text seeks to investigate is whether we ought to expand our moral obligations to include the                
well-being of animals in the wild. The question is a normative one. Therefore, this text does not                 
provide practical guidelines on how such an intervention should be organized merely whether it              
can be said that humans, as moral agents, have certain obligations towards wild animals.  
The aim of this text is twofold. The first is that I argue for the moral status of all sentient beings.                     
This claim requires two things. First, it needs to be established what beings are sentient and this                 
can be done empirically. The second is that it needs to be explained why sentient beings matter                 
morally. After having established this I will investigate if consequentialism is a suitable             
normative theory for intervention in nature. The text is structured in several different parts. I will                
start with looking at the concepts ​well-being ​and ​natural. ​Well-being is an important and not               
completely unproblematic concept when discussing this topic. What is natural is sometimes used             
as an argument for what is permissible or not and therefore in need of careful scrutiny. Section                 
3.3 deals with disvalue in nature and tries to establish an accurate account of the balance between                 
value and disvalue in nature. Section 3.4 will deal with sentientism and why sentience is relevant                
when considering moral duties towards wild animals. Section 3.5 discusses whether relationships            
are relevant for our moral obligations. Section 3.6 and 3.7 pits environmentalism against animal              
welfarism as two different approaches to how to view nature, moral status and our moral duties.                
Section 3.8 examines the difficult topic of predation. Section 3.9 questions futility and priority.              
Finally, 3.10 provides some concrete examples of aiding wild animals to show that it is not                
futile. In the analysis I summarize seven different counter-arguments to my thesis that we have               
moral obligations towards wild animals, and analyze whether they are persuasive or not. Then I               
present an argument from analogy to show that moral intuition can be helpful in establishing               
obligations to different beings. Lastly, I consider what actions are to be taken and bring up                
consequentialism as a prospective normative theory for intervention.  
 
2. Thesis 
I will argue for the thesis that we have moral obligations towards wild animals . Furthermore, I                5
argue that this implies that we ought to aid wild animals that suffer.  
4 Expenses can be measured in many different ways such as economic, time, effort etc. Here I mainly 
mean economic cost since that is usually a primary concern but that is not to say that the other aspects of 
cost would not factor in.  
5 “Wild animals” or “Animals in the wild” are animals that are neither domesticated nor tame and they live 
their lives outside of human restraints or care. 
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3. Background 
 
3.1 Well-being 
The term ​well-being relates to what it means for an individual to be well-off. A basic definition                 
of ​well-being would be the presence of pleasure and absence of pain. This is fundamental               
hedonism and as such is a theory of mental states. An important issue in this text is whether a                   
being is capable of suffering. The bottom line I wish to draw for moral considerability is                
essentially whether the life of a being can be better or worse, whether a being can suffer or be                   
well-off. Another important term for this is ​experiential harm​, meaning that one must be              
conscious to suffer in the relevant sense. In this way a plant, which is not conscious but alive,                  
cannot suffer in the relevant sense were it to, for example, wither. The basic definition of                
hedonism above might be too narrow since the importance of a mental state is not necessarily                
solely determined by whether it is pleasurable or not . I adopt a broader theory of mental states                 6
but do not wish to go as far as claiming that it is desire and satisfaction or a kind of externalism                     
that determine how well-off one is. In the end, what really determines how well-off one is, is                 
one’s subjective experiences.  
Well-being as the ultimate goal is a consequentialist notion and according to this we should               
strive to prevent pain and suffering and promote well-being when possible. If one were to ask                
what world is better, the one with more total amount of suffering or the one with more total                  
amount of well-being the latter is, quite uncontroversially, preferable.  
It is possible to talk about a sentient being’s well-being separated from that being’s subjective               
experience. One can talk about what is good for sentient beings without regard for their               
subjective experience. In cases regarding animals in the wild, one often does this by discussing               
behavior that allows the individual to “flourish” . This term seems to carry an idea of autonomy                7
as well as objective list theory where there are certain things that determine what make a life                 
better or worse separated from a being’s subjective experience . For this text the main focus is on                 8
the subjective experience of the individual beings and whether this experience is a positive or a                
negative one. Writers such as Mcmahan consider suffering as intrinsically bad which is also the               9
view for this text. Suffering is bad not just because it matters to me or that I care about the being                     
that suffers. Suffering is bad in itself and as Mcmahan puts it “[...] it is in the nature of suffering                    
that it ought not to be” (The Moral Problem of Predation p.10). This is so regardless of what                  
being is experiencing the suffering.  
6 See Kagan on ​mental statism ​1992 
7 See for example Nussbaum 2006 
8 For more on well-being see Roger Crisp 2017 
9 Mcmahan 2014 
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3.2 What is Natural? 
The issue of wild animal suffering is commonly met with arguments that “it is natural” for wild                 
animals to experience pain and other types of displeasure. The idea appears to be that suffering is                 
a natural part of the world and therefore nothing that requires critical scrutiny and remedy.               
Arguments like these sometimes seem to blur the difference in calling something natural and              
calling something unproblematic in a normative sense. However, such arguments prompt the            
question of what ‘natural’ means in these kinds of arguments, and whether these definitions can               
be used as valid arguments when considering disvalue in nature as ground for intervention. The               
concept of ‘natural’ is used, at least to some extent, in the philosophical discourse between               
environmentalists and animal welfarists, where the former critique the latter for failing to affirm              
and appreciate a part of nature that made us humans who we are, namely predation. These                
environmentalists argue that eating meat was a necessary part of evolution and the survival of               
our species, without which we would not be here. According to this line of argument, wanting to                 
e.g. minimize the suffering caused by predation is to turn away from nature and fail to affirm a                  
necessary part of it. Viewing the suffering in nature as regrettable (something animal welfarists              
are committed to do) is thus to want to separate from nature or transcend it. However,                
philosophers such as Jennifer Everett reject this kind of reasoning. She reasons that arguments              10
based on historical practices and evolution do not necessarily provide any reason for             
contemporary moral agents to continue and endorse such behavior if not necessary. If it indeed               
was necessary for our survival it would be difficult to argue that it was wrong at the time.                  
However, it is not the case that anything that has been part of human practice is also permissible.                  
As famously stated by Hume one cannot on good grounds derive an ought based on what is . It                  11
is also not the case that anything that seems natural in the sense of ‘normal’ or a widely spread                   
practice is beyond critical examination.  
 
We, humans, are able to realize the possible ethical issues present in our dietary habits in a way                  
that animals do not seem to be. A wolf or a lion is first of all dependent on eating meat since they                      
are carnivores, they need meat to survive. Also the wolf or the lion are not able to reflect on their                    
own behavior to realize that their dietary needs regrettably require the lives of other living               
sentient beings. They are unable to change their ways. We therefore often give animals a pass in                 
moral matters since they are not like us humans, moral agents capable of critical moral               
reasoning. However it might be too much to say that although we cannot blame the wolf or the                  
lion for their predatory behavior there is nothing morally wrong with it. That an action has                
negative consequences is important to a normative theory such as consequentialism not whether             
the actor can be blamed or not. Sapontzis brings this to attention and argues that it is quite                  12
10 Everett 2001 
11 Cohon 2018 
12 Sapontzis 1984 
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possible to consider an act of a being that is not a moral agent as still morally wrong. He makes                    
this very clear with an example of a small child torturing a cat. The child is not mature enough to                    
understand moral obligations or separate right from wrong, this however does not make the act               
of torturing the cat and the pain it suffers any less bad or the act any less wrong. Perhaps we                    
cannot in a genuine sense blame the child since it does not understand any better, but we can still                   
evaluate the action and determine the consequences to be bad and morally wrong. In the same                
way we cannot hold the wolf or the lion responsible but we, as moral agents, can still evaluate                  
their action and determine it as morally wrong in terms of value or disvalue. This clarification by                 
Sapontzis also shows why arguments put forth by philosophers such as, for instance, Regan are               13
unsatisfactory in relieving us from obligations towards wild animals​. Regan ​focuses on rights             
and argues that since the wolf is not a moral agent it cannot violate any rights, simply because it                   
is incapable of understanding the concepts of rights and if we have duties to intervene in cases                 
where animals’ rights are violated, the case where a wolf kills and eats a sheep is not such a case.                    
This hinges on the presumption that we have a duty to intervene only when animals’ rights are                 
being violated and not just more general perspectives of recognizing disvalue and possible             
prevention of suffering or acting based on moral intuition. Sapontzis’ view explains exactly what              
we do when we consider an act that creates disvalue. Regan’s view can be challenged by                
considering the same example but switching the sheep with a human. If the aim is to minimize                 
disvalue this is line of reasoning is unsatisfactory.  
Some view nature as something that warrants our respect and something humans should not              
intervene in. This non-intervention argument is used very inconsistently. There is usually little             
hesitation interfering and changing nature when we can benefit from it in some way, mostly               
economically. Take deforestation as an example. There is less and less natural forest in the world                
and more and more planted forest. This can be good for timber production but is usually bad for                  
biodiversity due to loss of natural habitat. Today about 7% of all forest is so called planted forest                  
meaning it was planted by humans, usually to produce timber . Mankind leaves huge marks on               14
nature in the pursuit of goods and economical gain. One of the most obvious ones is the                 
Athabasca oil sands in Alberta, Canada . Here oil is extracted through surface mining which              15
means complete clearing of the area mined. Another example is that we are currently living in                
what has been called the sixth mass extinction . Mankind is an extremely destructive species              16
and in more modern times this has accelerated in an alarming way. According to WWF’s “Living                
Planet Index” the world’s population of wild vertebrates has more than halved in only the last 40                 
13 Regan 1983 
14 http://www.fao.org/forestry/plantedforests/en/ 
15 https://www.energy.alberta.ca/OS/AOS/Pages/FAS.aspx 
16 Ceballos, Ehrlich and Dirzo 2017 
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years . Whether we actively intervene or not, our species is hardly leaving nature alone, we have                17
a huge impact on the world around us.  
Some philosophers might agree that there are certain interventions possible to aid animals             
suffering in nature. However, the matter of predation is too complex and too big for us to even                  
attempt any intervention. To escape obligations of policing nature on account of predation, one              
has to present convincing arguments for why predation must be left alone. Bruers attempts to               18
explain why we must accept predation as a part of nature. He formulates an interesting theory of                 
his “three-N-principle”. The three N:s stand for naturalness, normalcy and necessity and he             
argues that behavior that includes all three aspects must always be allowed. This suggests that               
predation would always be allowed as long as it checks the three criteria. If certain behavior                
must always be allowed due to the three N:s then we must allow predation by nonhuman                
carnivores to continue even though it contributes to disvalue in nature. This allows for us to call                 
predation unfortunate and regrettable, but ultimately we should let it continue as long as it               
follows the three Ns. It is worth noting here that one may still argue that nature would be a better                    
place without predation and this provides reason to eliminate it even if it does fulfill the                
three-N-criteria. From certain normative perspectives such as consequentialism the three Ns have            
little bearing since it is the result that matters and predation seems to contribute to disvalue in                 
nature.  
 
3.3 Disvalue in Nature 
Nature is ultimately contingent on the passing on of genes. The fight for survival is all about                 
getting the information present in your genetic material on to the next generation. Due to this and                 
the fact that resources in nature are finite (and hardly fairly distributed) it is quite simple to                 
understand that suffering is a large part of nature.  
Living organisms such as animals need a number of things such as food, water, shelter etc.                 
These do not come freely and without them one cannot sustain life. From an evolutionary               
perspective the individual’s reason for the struggle to stay alive is so one has the chance to                 
procreate and pass on one’s genes. It is common to have lots of offspring in order to maximize                  
the chances of at least some of them reaching adulthood and sexual maturity so that they in turn                  
can procreate and continue the passing of genes. This results in more individuals than resources               
necessary to sustain such a large number of beings. At least some, if not a lot of the beings                   
brought into this world, will starve, suffer and perish. One can in this way claim that the way                  
nature is set up is ultimately a system with an appalling amount of suffering present in it. Oscar                  
Horta writes in his text ​Evil in Nature: ​“The maximization of the transmission of genetic               
17 https://wwf.panda.org/knowledge_hub/all_publications/living_planet_index2/ 
18 Bruers 2015 
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material implies, in most cases, a process that also maximizes disvalue” (p.22, 2015). With              
nature comes disvalue.  
This prompts the question of whether nature is overall good or bad. This is a matter of                  
aggregation which might be important for normative theories, particularly, consequentialism.          
However, it is strictly only necessary to show that some disvalue exist in order to formulate an                 
argument for intervention. Nevertheless, if one consider nature and imagine a set of scales and               
add the total amount of suffering present in nature on a daily basis, and the total amount of                  
well-being present on a daily basis, to which side would the scales tip? This is an empirical                 
question and probably impossible to get an exact answer to. Not only because it is hard to                 
quantify and calculate suffering and well-being, but also because of the sheer amount of sentient               
beings. It is, however, possible to get a somewhat representative idea of whether nature is good                
or bad in terms of value or disvalue. Oscar Horta argues that if one were to sum up all the                    19
suffering and pit it against the well-being present in nature, then suffering would be much               
greater. In other words, disvalue is most common in nature. This can be argued for by looking at                  
population figures and the fact that they remain roughly the same. As mentioned, evolutionary              
strategy often makes it so that many individuals are brought into this world. This is to secure                 
one's genes will be carried on. The effect this has is that many individuals die early and often                  
painfully because there is not enough resources for everyone to survive. But even if we               
contemplate a world where there was enough resources for every individual right now, this              
would soon change since most species would use these resources to reproduce as much as               
possible and soon the situation of too many individuals with not enough resources would present               
itself. In this way, nature is evolutionarily conditioned to contain a lot of suffering for at least a                  
certain amount of individuals, i.e. those that do not “make it”.  
Tomasik discusses whether newborn or newly hatched animals have the capability to suffer.              20
The question is when sentience actually emerges in a newly formed living being. For mammals               
who give birth to well-developed offspring, so called ​precocial​, (an exception would be species              
that are ​alricial such as marsupials) it seems that the newborn is quite well-developed and               
capable of suffering. Regarding species that lay eggs, for example birds, Tomasik argues that              
also these animals have the capacity to suffer, if not from the moment of hatching, then at least                  
early in life due to rapid development. This would further strengthen the picture of nature as a                 
place of immense suffering since many of these new formed lives are fighting to survive from                
the start, and often perish early in life. 
Not all species function the same way when it comes to reproduction. There is a difference in                 
strategies for reproduction where a small amount of animals are K-selective and a great amount               
of animals are R-selective . K-selection means that one typically has few offspring and invests a               21
19 Horta 2015 
20 Tomasik 2015 
21 Horta 2015 
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great deal of effort and time to care for them while they grow up. This means, if not good, at                    
least decent chances for survival until one has reached sexual maturity. R-selective strategy on              
the other hand, is a strategy where a large amount of offspring is produced, but where it is not                   
possible to care for the offspring in the same way K-selective parents are able to. In many cases                  
no care is invested at all, for example when a bunch of eggs are laid and then left to hatch on                     
their own. In these cases the newly hatched offspring is alone to fight for its survival already                 
from the first moments of its life. This of course means that most of them do not make it and that                     
an early and possibly painful death is a reality for the great majority of individuals born in                 
nature. This is proven by the fact that population numbers remain roughly the same. In this way                 
it is possible to argue that disvalue, death and suffering outweighs well-being in nature even               
without having exact empirical data .  22
Consequentialism traditionally sees individuals as vessels for pleasure or pain and this means             
that one individual is completely exchangeable for another. If one does not accept this one has to                 
show why death is something bad for the individual. If there is nothing bad in the death of the                   
individual then one could speculate whether the well-being of those individuals that survive to              
live long and possibly good lives could, in total, outweigh the suffering of those that perish early                 
in life. Once dead, they do not suffer anymore whereas those that make it and live good life                  
experience a lot of good. On the whole there would be more positive experiences than negative                
ones. There is however no way to definitively show this. Even if this could be proven there                 
would still exist reason to consider intervention in nature as long as there is some disvalue                
present that could be prevented.  
3.3.1 Death 
In order to argue that nature is a place of disvalue one needs to show that suffering is part of it.                     
As we have seen there is good reason to believe that suffering is in fact a large part of the lives of                      
wild animals. If we accept that suffering is intrinsically bad, this gives us reason to try to                 
alleviate suffering and prevent it. This does not, however, provide us with a reason to save the                 
lives of those who suffer. Disease, starvation and predation can be said to be bad and should be                  
stopped because it causes suffering among sentient beings. If these factors, somehow, lead to the               
death of sentient creatures without causing them to suffer, death in itself would not necessarily               
be bad. Imagine a disease that painlessly kills its host or a case of predation where the predator                  
kills its prey without causing it any suffering. If one wishes to argue that it still would be bad to                    
die, one has to show why death is something bad. I will argue for the badness of death in virtue                    
of it being an extrinsic harm. It deprives a being capable of future good experiences of the                 
possibility to have those experiences . This would mean that death would be something bad for               23
at least most vertebrate animals since they are capable of having good experiences. Only in cases                
22 Horta 2015 
23 For more on this see Singer 1993 chapter “What’s wrong with killing?” 
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where it could be definitively proven that the future held no good experiences whatsoever could               
death be a preferable alternative. Perhaps one even could argue death would be preferable over a                
life where there were some good experience but a predominant amount of negative experiences.              
This is a simple case of comparativism, we simply compare whether not dying and continuing to                
live for a certain amount of time would have included more well-being . In this sense, it would                 24
be bad to die an early death but not necessarily bad or at least not as bad as living a full life and                       
dying of old age. It is not that death harms us (causes suffering), it is that it deprives us of goods                     
we would have had if death had not occurred. This makes it possible for death to not only be bad                    
but actually something good for a being if the occurrence of death prevents a continued existence                
that would have been filled with only or mostly suffering. This also serves as an argument to                 
why disvalue is more prevalent in nature than value, it is due to the vast amount of individual                  
animals that die an early death and are robbed of future good experiences.  
 
3.4 Sentience 
All sentient beings who have experienced suffering and wellbeing, know intuitively/instinctively           
that the latter is preferred over the former. The value assessment seems built into the experience                
of these states themselves. If the line for moral considerability is drawn at sentience, this makes                
it easier to grasp than trying to assign certain values, as in deontological theories, that often are                 
supposed to be absolute and therefore have to be justified in some further way.  
There remain practical difficulties to determine exactly all the beings who actually are sentient in               
a relevant manner. We grant a cow moral consideration but perhaps not a clam since the                
sentience of the latter seems uncertain. More research is needed to determine exactly what beings               
are sentient in the relevant manner. Today there is a consensus around the fact that vertebrates                
are sentient but when it comes to invertebrates it is less clear. For example, studies of fish                 
anatomy as well as experiments of negative stimulus have shown that fish have the basic               
physiology to experience pain and show behavioral patterns consistent with experiencing pain .            25
In contrast, it is much less certain whether insects experience pain at all. There are not enough                 
studies and the ones conducted have proven inconclusive. It seems that certain insects do behave               
in a way that could be interpreted as experiencing pain when presented with a negative stimuli                
but this is not always consistent. So the status of insects is unclear, however, similar studies have                 
shown that it is very plausible that crustacean such as lobsters or crabs can experience pain . It                 26
seems then that a variety of animals are definitely sentient in a relevant manner for moral                
consideration. Even though, there are still many cases where scientists are not sure and more               
studies need to be conducted. Pain is a problematic phenomenon since it is a mental state and                 
24 Luper 2016 
25 Jones, R. C. 2013 
26 Jones, R. C. 2013 
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difficult to study since we cannot have firsthand access to the subjective experience and in the                
case of animals we cannot ask them to explain their experience. Instead scientists are forced to                
study the anatomy of certain animals and their behavior and reactions to certain stimuli and draw                
conclusions from there. What is important for this text is that we already today can show that                 
many vertebrates are in fact sentient in a relevant manner to matter morally. We can look to                 
ourselves and understand the importance of whether our life is going well or poorly, it is also                 
easy for us to understand that this is equally important to all sentient beings capable of having a                  
life that can be better or worse. It seems intuitively true that pain is bad and pleasure good.  
 
3.5 The Importance of Relations  
Writers such as Clare Palmer concede the notion that we have duties towards animals but seek                27
to draw a line that ultimately only requires us to morally consider domesticated animals within               
our care. The way they do this is by arguing that certain relationships generate certain               
obligations. This kind of thinking makes a lot of sense when one considers a mother’s obligation                
to care for her child as opposed to her having obligations towards another mother’s child. Palmer                
argues that we have obligations to care about domesticated animals’ well-being since we are in a                
way responsible for the dependent position they are in. In this way I am responsible for my pet                  
since it is dependent on me in a way a wild animal is not. This dependency creates a moral                   
obligation that does not translate to animals in the wild that we have no relationship with.                
Granted that writers such as Palmer have a point in arguing that we have a strong obligation                 
towards domesticated animals it does not necessarily follow that we have no obligations towards              
wild animals.  
The obligations to domesticated animals, who are dependent on us humans, might be stronger              
than obligations owed to wild animals which are independent. However, this point becomes less              
obvious if we consider the same idea but swap animals with humans. Catia Faria does this and                 28
argues that the intuitive response is that I would have an equal obligation no matter if we are                  
talking about helping a person with whom I stand in relation to or a person I do not. Perhaps a                    
case can be made that there is a stronger case for ​helping if I have a relationship with the person                    
and this would explain why it would be morally permissible to prioritize helping one’s family               
member over helping a stranger. This makes sense due to the meaningful relationship I have with                
one of these beings which affects the moral balance in the situation. ​However, this does not mean                 
one does not have any obligation to the stranger. So, comparing animals and human beings               
makes it difficult to argue for a clear difference in obligations towards them without becoming               
guilty of speciesism . Faira also brings up another way of getting out of obligation towards wild                29
27 Palmer 2015 
28 Faria 2015 
29 Speciesism is the practice of arbitrary discrimination based on species affiliation.  
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animals. She presents the idea of responsibility and formulates what one might call the              
responsibility argument. She argues that if I am directly responsible or even indirectly             
responsible for another individual’s suffering then I am obligated to help that individual.             
Something along the line of: if I have caused you pain then I am obligated to make amends by                   
helping you alleviate or compensate that pain. This also means that since I did not cause any of                  
the suffering many of the animals in the wild experience, then I am not under any moral                 
obligation to alleviate it. Faria maintains that one is allowed to help them if one wants to, but not                   
required. Real moral obligation only comes with responsibility. This would draw a line where we               
have to consider the well-being of other people around us and our domesticated animals but not                
that of wild animals, since we have no interaction with them and therefore have not caused their                 
situation. It is however, not very clear what we are responsible for. There are many wild animals                 
living in our cities or close to our societies. Surely we affect them with our behavior in many                  
ways. The way our societies extend their territories and enclose wild animals’ habitats is another               
example. Furthermore, the way humans affect the climate has an impact on animals in the wild                
and in many cases seems to create difficulties for them. Recent studies show that the human                
population only makes out about 0,01% of life on earth in terms of biomass. From this                
perspective mankind is a very small part of the world, compared to bacteria which make out 13%                 
or plants at 82%. In fact, the remaining five percent is shared by animals, fungi and humans. In                  
this way mankind may seem insignificant, but that is far from the truth. The same study shows                 
that since the rise of civilization, humans are responsible for the undoing of more than 80% of                 
wild animals. For example today 70% of the world’s birds are poultry, mostly chickens. Only               
30% are wild species. Even more staggering, 96% of all the mammals on earth are either humans                 
or livestock kept by humans. Only 4% are wild. In this way the insignificant human has an                 
enormous impact on the world and the animals living in it . According to WWF’s Living                30 31
Planet Index the number of land living animals has decreased by 40% since 1970 . Based on                32
these facts one could argue that we ought to help these animals since it seems we as a species are                    
responsible for the fate of many other beings. Mankind has a substantial impact on nature in                
numerous ways, so there may be many ways to argue that we are directly or indirectly                
responsible for the future of animals living in the wild. Ultimately, establishing what obligations              
we have based solely on what we have caused might be very difficult.  
A different approach on how to view our responsibilities and relationship to animals is presented               
by Donaldson & Kymlicka . They suggest making use of political theory in our decisions on               33
how to act towards animals. This would yield similar result as those Palmer advocates but on                
different grounds. For example, we ought to, according to Donaldson & Kymlicka, care for our               
30https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/may/21/human-race-just-001-of-all-life-but-has-destroy
ed-over-80-of-wild-mammals-study 
31 ​ Yinon M. Bar-On, Rob Phillips, Ron Milo 2018 
32 https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/sep/29/earth-lost-50-wildlife-in-40-years-wwf 
33 Donaldson & Kymlicka 2011 
12 
domesticated animals since they are part of our society and dependent on us. Truly wild animal                
are different. The wild could be seen as a sovereign state where we have no authority to meddle.                  
This ascribes a certain competence and grants certain autonomy to wild animals. We can              
therefore see our society as one state and the wild as another. They are independent and one is                  
not allowed to interfere with the other. There is also a middle point between truly wild and                 
domesticated. They call these kinds of animals “liminal animals” and they are the type of               
animals that are not tame but live in our cities in close proximity and contact with us. Donaldson                  
& Kymlicka argue that these liminal animals do not earn the same obligations as domesticated               
ones, but that we at least ought to consider them since our actions without a doubt affect them.  
 
3.6 Environmentalism 
The topic of intervention in nature is split in two sides - environmentalism and animal welfarism.                
The first one, environmentalism, argues that it is not the sentient individuals living in nature and                
the individual experience in their lives that are important. Instead, it is the system that they are a                  
part of that is valued. The well-being of individual sentient beings is not prioritized; it is the                 
function and protection of natural systems or processes, for example, an ecosystem. The             
individuals living in that ecosystem can actually be said to have an instrumental value in that                
they contribute to keeping the ecosystem intact. In other words, it is completely justifiable to               
sacrifice sentient individuals in nature if it serves to protect and conserve a natural process or                
ecosystem.  
A central concern for the environmentalist position seems to be that an ethical theory based on                
sentience such as that of animal welfarism (see next section) would fail in ascribing obligations               
and restrictions that are necessary in order to protect nature. It would be difficult to build an                 
appropriate environmental ethical theory while focusing solely on sentientism. If we take the             
example of cutting down a forest, the way an animal welfarist would argue against this would be                 
because the forest holds an instrumental value in that there are sentient creatures, whose              
well-being matters morally, who are dependent on it. We should not cut down the forest because                
it would impact the lives of those creatures negatively. The forest itself does not suffer and                
therefore its well-being cannot be the direct reason for not cutting it down. The environmentalist               
view does not accept this as a sufficient reason to protect the forest. The environmentalist would                
argue that the forest itself holds intrinsic value and therefore should not be cut down even if there                  
are no sentient creatures whose well-being depends on it. So sentientism, according to             
environmentalists, will be too permissive and endorse many environmentally destructive          
practices.  
Another environmentalist argument against animal welfarism is to point out the consequences of             
putting such emphasis on sentience and well-being. When this reasoning is taken all the way, it                
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seems to imply that we ought to intervene in all aspects of nature that create disvalue, even                 
predation. This would be too demanding. This argument takes the form of a classical ​reductio ad                
absurdum​. Overall, part of the critique aimed at animal welfarism by environmentalists is that it               
is anti-environmental or that it leads to a conclusion that is too demanding and absurd.  
There is usually a conflict between giving importance to a whole or to individuals. It is difficult                 
to do both at the same time. In nature we find food chains based on predation and prey and                   
complicated balances of ecosystems where the different parts are dependent on each other. If              
focus lies on the bigger picture it is often required to neglect certain individuals for the greater                 
good. In the same way, if focus is put on individuals it is often hard to satisfy their needs as well                     
as benefiting the whole. For example, if we were to put out food for wild animals, so called                  
“supplemental feeding,” this would likely have a positive effect on certain individuals who             34
would benefit from this extra resource. However, such a simple thing can have many              
consequences that affect the bigger picture. It is hard to predict these effects exactly. Brennan               35
discusses some of the possible effects of supplemental feeding. It might cause an increase in               
predation since animals would concentrate in a certain area where the food was placed or it                
might lead to a decrease in predation since there would be more eyes present able to look out for                   
predators. Animals congregating in this way around feed might also be a cause of disease               
spreading. Supplemental feeding might also have long term effects on population numbers where             
more individuals survive or have more offspring. These are just some examples that could              
benefit the individuals but might offset the balance of the ecosystem which could have long               
lasting effects on individuals as well as the bigger picture.  
 
An important critique of the environmental holistic view is that the same way of thinking does                
not seem to be applied to humans. We usually refuse to sacrifice an individual to benefit the                 
whole. This can be motivated by various reasons, such as, it would be unfair or that would be                  
treating individuals as means to an end which is forbidden. Arguing that this should be allowed                
with animals but not humans seems speciesist.  
Environmentalists argue that an ethical theory solely based on sentientism and assigning             
merely instrumental value to nature and natural processes would not sufficiently protect nature             
and the environment. In order to not endorse environmentally destructive practices we need to              
consider nature itself morally. This is problematic since it raises the question of on what grounds                
one can ascribe intrinsic value to something non-sentient. Different theories for nature or natural              
processes holding objective intrinsic value have been presented, most notable are the ​inherent             
worth view and the ​natural-historical value view​. The first assigns value to natural entities based               
on their independence from human design and control. The second claim that all living              
34 Brennan 2018 
35 Brennan 2018 
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organisms or even natural systems have a good of their own so called inherent worth . Both                36
views have received criticism in how they justify this value.  
 
3.7 Animal Welfarism 
Supporters of animal welfarism hold that if we reject speciesism then we are justified and even                
obligated to intervene in nature to promote the well-being of wild nonhuman sentient beings.              
This is argued for using arguments that compare human and nonhuman suffering. If we have a                
moral obligation to intervene and help humans suffering from, for instance a natural disaster,              
then we are obliged to help nonhuman sentient beings in similar situations. Since both humans               
and animals are equal in the relevant sense, namely that they can suffer, it would be inconsistent                 
and speciesist of us to argue that we ought to help only humans. This is an argument based on                   
reason, for it would be inconsistent to concede that two different beings are equal in the relevant                 
sense and then treat them differently without having good reason to do so. Animal welfarists               
argue that there is no such reason and therefore we must consider them equally regarding               
suffering and well-being. It might be that our intuition is stronger when we consider our               
obligation to help a human suffering. We perhaps have a stronger feeling of obligation or guilt if                 
we ignore a suffering human being than if we do the same with a sentient nonhuman being.                 
However, here reason checks intuition and gives us reason to question it. There are many               
differences between humans and animals but it is hard to pinpoint one that would justify               
inconsistent treatment of the two when we are considering well-being/suffering. 
It is often the case that animal welfarists are criticized by environmentalist for endorsing a view                
that entails absurd obligations, such as having to police nature to prevent predation and the               
suffering it causes. Writers such as Everett have argued that it is not true that animal welfarists                 37
are necessarily committed to such an extent. She argues that some of the critique confuses value                
gained and value lost in different situations. She means that there are significant differences in               
the cases that environmentalists often use as examples. These differences weaken their            
arguments considerably.  
Part of the critique is that it is inconsistent to condemn recreational hunting on a                
consequentialist basis since it contributes to disvalue (animals die), and then to not condemn              
predation where animals also die. Everett argues that this simple way of looking at it might be                 
persuasive but that is because one is focused on the loss in both cases. What one also needs to                   
consider is the gain in each case. In the case of predation it is a necessity to sustain the life of the                      
predator, in the case of recreational hunting it is not done out of necessity since there are other                  
options available to the hunter to sustain a life of the same quality. In this sense, the hunting                  
36 https://www.nature.com/scitable/knowledge/library/intrinsic-value-ecology-and-conservation-25815400  
37 Everett 2001 
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seems unnecessary and it is difficult to justify the disvalue that it creates, whereas in the case of                  
the predator killing its prey is based on necessity for the continued survival of that predator .                38
Everett argues that the suffering caused by predation in the wild might very well be, all things                 
considered, outweighed by the flourishing of predators in nature that would otherwise not             
survive. This might be so even if the suffering in the different cases is quite different, since a                  
skilled hunter may kill an animal painlessly and predation rarely is as clean as the shot of a                  
well-aimed rifle. These kinds of examples confuse what is gained and what is lost and Everett                
therefore maintains that they to do not show that animal welfarists are committed to condemn               
predation as environmentalists often claim. Everett writes: “It is no excuse for the human hunter               
to claim, “what I am doing to this animal is no worse than what would probably be done to it                    
eventually by some other animal.” The relevant question is whether what he or she is doing is                 
worse than what he or she otherwise could do” (Environmental Ethics, Animals Welfarism and              
the Problem of Predation p.8). 
Another way to get out of the obligation of policing nature would be to, on a consequentialist                 
basis and in terms of aggregation, argue that the system in nature of predators and prey,                
essentially, “survival of the fittest” is the one that as a whole is the best one in terms of                   
contribution to a balance of both ecosystem and individual well-being. It is a way to agree with                 
the environmentalist side that ecosystems can be valuable, but the argument is based on              
consequences and not any intrinsic value of such natural entities. This might however be              
stretching it a bit far, since writers such as Horta have showed that just by a quick                 39
contemplation of the mechanism prevalent in nature, where predation plays a big part, suffering              
and disvalue seem to heavily outweigh well-being. This seems to indicate that nature without              
predation would be a better place.  
MacClellan makes the tension between the two views very clear by identifying two different              40
intuitions. One he gets from Scanlon while the other was coined by Palmer:  
“Welfarist Intuition: Pain – whether that of rational creatures or nonrational ones – is something               
we have prima facie reason to prevent, and stronger reason not to cause.  
Laissez-Faire Intuition: [W]hile we should care for and assist domesticated animals, we should             
just leave wild animals alone” (Minding Nature p.4). 
However, MacClellan maintains that they do not always have to be in contention over every                
issue. For example, intervention in cases of natural disaster or injury with the aim of aiding                
suffering animals can easily be conjoined with an environmentalist agenda. Often an            
environmentalist would advocate the same action merely based on different reasons such as             
preservation of biodiversity. In other cases where animal welfarists advocate the elimination of             
38 Oscar Horta gives an excellent example of the gains and losses in different cases in his example of “the 
fox, the rabbit and the two vegan food rations” in “Disvalue in Nature and Intervention” 2010 
39 Horta 2015 
40 MacClellan 2012 
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predators or even the domestication of all animals for their own wellbeing, environmentalists are              
hard set against such ideas.  
 
3.8 Problematic Predation 
As mentioned before, predation poses a particularly challenging problem when considering           
disvalue in nature. It would seem easier to administer food or shelter to animals than to protect                 
prey from predator and still satisfy the predator’s needs. The suffering caused by predation is               
hardly our fault and therefore many would say we do not need to bother, but due to the disvalue                   
it creates we have to ask seriously whether we ought to prevent it. 
It seems clear that human beings, as moral agents, should give up predation and turn vegan if we                  
value the well-being of sentient beings. The problem lies in predation in nature between predator               
and prey that are not moral agents. Common objection to such an idea is a practical one: “how                  
could we ever possibly manage to actually prevent predation in the wild?” But there are options                
available. We could for instance exterminate all predators. This, however, might not be a feasible               
option since many typical prey animals tend to reproduce in large numbers so that at least some                 
of the individuals being born will survive and reach adulthood. This would mean that if predators                
were removed, we would probably see issues with overpopulation in many species and this              
might end up causing more suffering than predation did. For instance, a world without predators               
might lead to mass starvation due to lack of resources caused by a massive population growth.                
Mcmahan calls this argument “the counterproductivity argument” and concedes that this might            41
be a valid argument in current time but also points towards possible ways around it in the future                  
with advancement in research and technology. In certain ways predation might be preferable to              
other outcomes when one considers the overall well-being in nature.  
One way to control the herbivore population if predation was removed would be to sterilize a                 
certain amount of individuals so that the species did not exceed the level of sustainable numbers.                
This, however, would require advancements in medicine since most options today are based on              
surgery. There are other methods available such as injection, implants or oral bait, but these               
suffer from the impracticality of not being permanent solutions and would require regular             
administration to be effective .  42
It can also be difficult to establish exactly which animals are predators. There are the obvious                 
examples of lions and tigers but the reality is that many animals that typically are not thought of                  
as predator will not pass on the chance to prey on other animals if the opportunity presents itself.                  
For example, deer that are typically regarded as herbivores have been observed eating snails at               
times.  
41 Mcmahan 2014 
42 ​Hampton JO, Hyndman TH, Barnes A, Collins T. 2015 
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Predation is a very complex issue when considering nature in terms of well-being and disvalue.               
The three-N-principle (discussed in 3.2) would suggest that most of it (not predation by humans               
since it strictly is not necessary) must be allowed. If one accepts this, it has large consequences                 
of what kind of interventions we ought to make in nature. It would still be possible to argue that                   
we ought to help animals in the wild when they suffer from disease, starvation or natural disaster                 
of various kinds, but not predation. Some philosophers, such as MacClellan , have tried to argue               43
for intervention in nature but try to circumvent the conclusion that a commitment to eliminate               
predation is necessary. Others such as Mcmahan seriously suggest the elimination of predation             44
but point out that more research and advancement in technology is needed before we can               
proceed.  
 
3.9 Futility and Priority 
The notion of intervention in nature can come across completely futile. One could with good               
reason argue that there is simply no way we could ever prevent all the suffering in nature, least                  
of all, suffering caused by predation. It is simply not feasible. Only God could do something like                 
that and we are not God. However, there are those that claim that such arguments are                
unpersuasive. To look at the project as a whole and give up is to give up too easily. Sapontzis                   45
writes: “That a condition is one we cannot attain does not disqualify it from being a useful moral                  
ideal”.  
There might be a relevant question of how we justify putting resources into helping animals in                
the wild when there are people in our world suffering from, for example, starvation or extreme                
poverty. This is a complicated question since this text claims that animals and humans should be                
considered in the same way regarding suffering. However, this question seems to carry some              
intuitive weight. It is not unreasonable to ask whether we should prioritize members of our own                
species. I believe this has to do with relation and how we sympathize with a being that is                  
suffering. It is simple to argue that it is easier to relate and sympathize with another human being                  
than for instance a deer, and if we swap the deer with a fish or frog this point becomes even                    
clearer. Quite naturally we have less in common with these beings than we do with beings of our                  
own species. Also, our way of expressing, for instance, distress is clearer in cases between               
beings of the same species. However, is there a legitimate argument here? Does my relating               
more easily to a member of my own species work as a legitimate argument for prioritizing them                 
over beings of other species or is it merely a form of speciesism? This question is indeed                 
problematic if one wants to argue that there should be no such priority given whatsoever. That                
might be unrealistic and too far from how human emotions such as compassion or empathy               
43 MacClellan 2012 
44 Mcmahan 2014 
45 Sapontzis 1984 
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actually function. On the other hand, accepting such priority seems dangerously speciesist. As in              
the case where there is nothing morally out of place with a mother caring for her child and                  
prioritizing her child’s well-being over other children, there might be a similarity here where one               
cares more for other humans and would prioritize their well-being over other animals.  
Consider the following quandary; I got myself into a situation where I have to prioritize. The                 
stakes are the lives and well-being of a human and a non-human animal; let’s say a mammal of                  
some sort. I have the option to save and spare one of them a great deal of suffering, but only one.                     
I save the animal and let the human die. This would be perfectly fine from a consequentialist                 
point of view as long as it could be shown that the amount of well-being or suffering would be                   
the same no matter what choice was made or that in fact the animal would experience more                 
well-being than the human. In spite of leaning on a normative theory that give a distinct answer                 
in this case even the most concerned advocates of animal welfare would probably have a hard                
time defending and explaining such action to general inquiry of why the human was not saved                
instead. Maybe there is something important in how we relate to another being and how we                
empathize with it. Could this be used as a legitimate argument or does one collapse into                
speciesism? Either way, what is important for this text is that since both beings are sentient they                 
deserve the same status and considerations before we decide how to act. It is important to keep in                  
mind that in cases where one has to prioritize, such prioritization does not mean that the                
neglected part does not share equal moral status, merely that it was not possible to act in way that                   
fulfilled one’s moral obligation to both parties. As in the example given before the mother is                
allowed to prioritize her own baby but this only goes for extreme cases where circumstances               
force prioritization, the same would not be morally acceptable in other cases. A mother would be                
allowed to save her child from danger over saving someone else's child, however, were that other                
child and danger and the mother could intervene and did not, this would be wrong.  
 
3.10 Examples of Aiding in a Concrete way 
Sometimes the idea of aiding wild animals is seen as futile. Such views fail to notice the different                  
projects already taking place. Even though the aim was perhaps not always the reduction of               
suffering in nature, there are plenty of examples were humans have done some excellent work               
for the benefit of certain animals in the wild. One such example is the vaccination of rabies.                 
Rabies is a viral disease that animals and humans can incur. The disease causes fever and                
inflammation of the brain which has various effects such as anxiety, agitation, paralysis of throat               
(difficulties swallowing) etc. Rabies is almost always fatal. Although there is no treatment to              
cure rabies once one has contracted the disease, there is a vaccine to prevent the spreading of it .                  46
There have been several successful vaccination projects to prevent the spreading of rabies not              
just to humans but among animals as well. In the US it has been successfully eliminated in                 
46 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rabies 
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several regions. With humans or with domestic pets the vaccine is easily administered through a               
shot but it is also possible to administer orally. This has been done by putting out bait that                  
contained the vaccine for wild animals to eat to acquire immunity. This has successfully              
eradicated or severely reduced the disease among animal populations such as raccoons or             
coyotes in the US . The motivation for this was perhaps more for the benefit and safety for us                  47
humans and our pets, but there can be no denying that this also benefits the wild animals that                  
otherwise might have contracted such an awful and deadly disease. Putting the question of              
motive aside, this is a clear example of how we can do concrete and substantial work to reduce                  
suffering in nature.  
Another example is the research and identification of the PDV virus that caused an epidemic               
among harbor seals in the North and Baltic Sea in 1988. The infectious disease killed over                
17 000 harbor seals in that year alone. However, with some serious effort, solid research and               
several nations working together, the mysterious epidemic was found out to have been caused by               
a virus closely related to one previously known to infect dogs called CDV. This closely related                
but still different virus was called PDV and there were successful tests done using the already                
known CDV vaccine to immunize seals for PDV . It was also shown that seals were able to                 48
produce antibodies naturally to fight of the virus. Today seals living in the wild are not                
vaccinated due to the difficulties involved when administering the vaccine to wild marine             
animals, however, the vaccine for CDV can be used successfully on individual seals in              
rehabilitation centers to prevent them from future contagion .  49
A third example is WWF’s “flagship species” the gorilla. Today WWF is working to protect all                
great apes since they are facing many threats. Some of the largest threats to gorillas are loss of                  
habitat and hunting. The forest area is shrinking due to expansion in logging, agriculture and               
road building. The hunting of gorillas is mostly for meat . Efforts are being made to protect both                 50
the gorillas’ habitat as well as their lives. In 2002 the WWF set up the “African Great Apes                  
Programme” which aim is, through cooperation of several African nations, to protect these             
animals. Again, this work seems to be motivated mainly on conservational grounds but that does               
not mean the individual gorilla’s well-being is not increased when having enough habitat to              
sustain its way of life and enjoying protection from poachers. One cannot deny that the work                
being done is important from an environmentalist as well as an animal welfarist view.  
Examples like these show that it is not only very possible to aid wild animals in meaningful ways                  
but also that is not as farfetched as one might first think. The two first examples mentioned are                  
47http://www.animal-ethics.org/wild-animal-suffering-section/helping-animals-in-the-wild/vaccinating-healin
g-sick-injured-animals/ 
48 https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/19186428.pdf (Mass Mortality in Seals Caused by a Newly Discovered 
Virus-like Morbillivirus) 
49 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4276944/ 
50 http://wwf.panda.org/knowledge_hub/endangered_species/great_apes/gorillas/threats/ 
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disease related and the third has to do with protection, but they all go a long way to show that we                     
can make a difference for other sentient beings beside ourselves. This also goes for other cases                
such as malnutrition/starvation, injury or natural disasters etc.  
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4. Analysis 
4.1 The argumentation 
The fact that many animals are sentient beings coupled with the intrinsic badness of suffering,               
forms the basis for intervention in nature, intervention to alleviate suffering and thus reduce              
disvalue. The argumentation for this thesis is quite straightforward. The first part simply             
stipulates the badness of suffering. Then, if one can show animals can suffer in a relevant sense                 
the subsequent conclusion would be that it is bad when animals are subjected to circumstances               
causing them to suffer. 
Furthermore, one can argue, not only that suffering is bad, but also that we have an obligation                  
to intervene and aid a suffering human being if possible. Based on this, again if one can show                  
that animals can suffer in a relevant sense then one should accept a third premise that; animals                 
are equal to humans in the relevant moral sense regarding suffering.  
Here one can draw the conclusion that: there exists an obligation to help animals in the same                 51
sense as we should help humans. To argue otherwise would need a conclusive argument that               
shows some significant and relevant difference between humans and animals, anything else            
would be speciesist. I cannot find any such argument. From this, one can gather that there are                 
two options available: either we give up on trying to establish certain moral obligations to those                
in need or we expand the circle to include all sentient beings.  
In spite of this, many believe and argue that we ought not to intervene in nature. Let us look at                    
some common views and arguments which oppose intervention in nature with the aim of aiding               
animal suffering and analyze and answer them accordingly. The counter-arguments I have tried             
to account for earlier can be listed as follows: 
1. The argument that nature is a neutral moral landscape. 
2. The argument of nonintervention.  
3. The argument of animals’ competence and autonomy.  
4. The sentience argument. 
5. The responsibility argument. 
6. The argument of relation.  
7. The reductio ad absurdum argument.  
I believe that none of the presented arguments effectively dismiss the notion of aiding suffering               
animals in the wild.  
1. The argument that nature is a neutral moral landscape. 
51 Here obligation means prima facie reason.  
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Nature is natural but it is not neutral if one refers to value versus disvalue in terms of well-being                   
and suffering. It can be shown even without exact empirical data that the mechanisms of               
evolution create an abundance of disvalue. It is a misconception to claim that what is natural is                 
also neutral. It all depends on how one defines neutral, and if what we are concerned about is the                   
suffering of sentient beings, then nature is far from neutral.  
 
2. The argument of non-intervention 
Mankind has evolved into what it is today as part of nature. To want to fundamentally change                 
nature is to try to transcend it, something we should not do since we are part of it, not above it.  
This argument depends on what it refers to, to simply change nature is something humans have                
always been trying to do. We manipulate it to benefit or profit from it in many ways.  
Sometimes notions such as these are met with the simple argument: “mankind should not play                
God”. One can really wonder what it means to play God. If it is as simple as changing nature,                   
then we humans play God all the time. Maybe it has to do more with changing the fundamental                  
system that seems to be built into nature? Again, we seem to do this in various ways already. So,                   
why should we not play God? If the aim is to maximize well-being and minimize suffering then                 
intervention would be the right thing to do. From a consequentialist perspective there is no               
wrong with acting this way as long as it leads to good consequences.  
The way Donaldson and Kymlicka propose to approach the idea of nonintervention is to view                
the wild animal kingdom as a sovereign state. We do not have the authority to intervene or                 
interfere in its business. This argument is certainly interesting but also problematic. To change              
the view from a moral to a political one does not make it any simpler and one risks losing certain                    
important elements. First of all, how do we determine the wild? Wild animal are to be considered                 
part of their own sovereign state but what exactly defines the wild and its wild inhabitants? There                 
is most likely no clear definition for this which makes it practically problematic. It is one thing to                  
refer to wild animals as animals living outside of human care/constraints and another to try and                
define the wild as something similar to a state. Secondly, in cases of intervention between               
political states, there are times when such intervention might very well be justified. For example,               
in cases of famine, natural disasters or when a regime is oppressing its inhabitants and force                
them to live in conditions of great suffering, intervention might be called for.  
 
3.  The argument of animals’ competence and autonomy.  
Another way to argue for non-interference in nature would be to point to animals’ competence to                
fend for themselves. Something along the line of: Why should we concern ourselves with              
animals when they are fit to fend for themselves and do not need us to babysit them? ​Wild                  
animals are free and independent creatures. This, however, does not make them invulnerable.             
There is an enormous amount of suffering in nature. Wild animals have the ability to fend for                 
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themselves but that does not mean that they always manage to successfully do so. If they fail to                  
fend for themselves we ought not to ignore their misfortunes and suffering on the technicality               
that they have this ability. One sometimes speaks of competence, meaning that wild animals              
have the competence to look after themselves and survive in nature. While this is true to some                 
extent it is also misguided. Every day there are uncountable examples of individual animals              
losing the “fight for survival” and falling prey to predation, starvation, disease etc. Even the most                
well adapted still struggle periodically due to the many unfortunate circumstances and strenuous             
trials nature presents.  
 
4. The sentience argument. 
Perhaps some animals are sentient beings but far from all of them. It is notoriously hard to                 
empirically measure the experience of pain. Even so, many tests indicate that many living              
creatures are sentient. There are cases that are more difficult, such as determining the sentience               
of clams or jellyfish, but in many other cases it seems clear that vertebrates do in fact experience                  
pain and can suffer. This is supported by the Cambridge Declaration of Consciousness.   52
Another version of the sentience argument is: even if many non-human animals are sentient               
they cannot compare to humans in regards to suffering, therefore we should mainly focus our               
moral attention to humans. This might be a sound argument if we can show that this is the case.                   
However, it still gives us no reason to ignore wild animals that actually do suffer, it merely                 
allows a certain priority as to where we put most of our effort in aiding and alleviating suffering.  
 
5. The responsibility argument. 
We have not caused the suffering of wild animals and are therefore not obligated to aid them. If I                   
have caused you harm I am obligated to help you but if I have not caused your suffering I am                    
permitted to help but not required. This is a suspicious notion of only being obligated as long as                  
one is responsible. It is easy to show that this is not the case if we think about a scenario where a                      
human being is suffering from a disease. If I have medicine to cure the disease of another person                  
it seems untenable to argue that since I did not cause the disease I am not obliged to give him or                     
her the medicine. One might even go as far as to say that it would be cruel of me to deny him or                       
her the medicine. To seriously state that I am allowed to help but not required, even though                 
providing the medicine would increase the sick person’s well-being, seems too liberal. I believe              
we all would condemn such behavior and reject a moral theory that condoned it. It is backwards                 
to think that an obligation comes from having done something to or for someone. So, if this is                  
what intuition tells us when we consider human beings, and this moral intuition is based on the                 
fact that human beings are sentient beings, then it seems difficult to escape the same conclusion                
52 http://fcmconference.org/img/CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf 
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when it comes to other sentient animals. On the basis of sentientism there should be no                
difference in the case if we swap the suffering human for a sentient animal. Granted that if I am                   
in fact responsible for another being’s misfortune that being may have an even stronger claim on                
me than if I was not responsible, but that is not to say that there is no obligation if I am not the                       
cause just that there might an even stronger claim if I am.  
 
 
6. The argument of relation.  
Some argue that obligations come with relations. This is somewhat similar to the previous              
argument but instead of focusing on whether I am responsible for having caused your misfortune               
it focuses on the whether we stand in a meaningful relationship that entail certain obligations. If                
we have no relation to truly wild animals then there exist no obligations towards them. There can                 
exist obligation towards animals that I stand in relation to in some relevant sense, say pets or                 
animals I share the close environment with. The line can be drawn a bit differently, but as we                  
have seen above, there are those like Palmer who argue that domesticated animals stand in a                53
dependent position to us and therefore we have a special relationship to them that comes with                
certain moral obligations. Wild animals are not dependent on us in this sense and therefore we do                 
not have the same obligations to them.  
The issue with such a view is that it might seem clear if we consider for example my dog (a                     
dependent pet) and a polar bear (a truly wild animal living in the remote wilderness), however, it                 
becomes a lot less clear when we consider other animals, the kind of animals Kymlicka call                
“liminal animals”. These are the kind of animals that live close to us but are not domesticated,                 54
many types of birds, rodents like rats and squirrels and other mammals such as deer and raccoon.                 
These are just some examples of animals that are wild in the sense that they are not domesticated                  
but live in or in close proximity to our society. We can hardly claim that our habits and actions                   
do not affect these animals. Many of these animals adapt to our lifestyle and make use of it, like                   
rats and raccoons living off what we throw away, or birds and deer seizing the opportunity to                 
feed in our gardens. In this way it is truly difficult to maintain that I have no relation to these                    
wild animals. And as we have seen, the practices of humans have come to have a truly global                  
impact on almost all wild environments of the planet. This creates a relation to wild animals such                 
as polar bears as well. 
 
More importantly, the underlying reason for aiding a domesticated or wild animal is its              
well-being. Furthermore, the thesis of this text is that we should care for the well-being of                
sentient beings in virtue of nothing else than their sentience. Therefore, Palmer’s argument is              
53 Palmer 2015 
54 Donaldson & Kymlicka 2011  
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hardly persuasive. If we are to be consistent and base our view on sentientism, then we should                 
care about the well-being of sentient beings regardless of if they are wild or domesticated.  
 
7. The reductio ad absurdum argument. 
If we actually were to agree to the idea of an existing obligation to minimize suffering among                 
sentient beings, there would be no end to the cost of such a project. Simply put, it is too                   
demanding practically and too much to ask of us as moral agents. It would be absurd. 
 
I believe this is a serious challenge to the idea of aiding animals in the wild. It would be very                    
demanding. One could very well claim that it would be too demanding and absurd. However,               
doing the right thing often is demanding. The argument based on a reductio is not the classical                 
Kantian notion of ought implying can. We are not powerless or completely incapable when it               
comes to making meaningful changes in the lives of animals in the wild. We can do a lot,                  
perhaps not everything, but still a lot. When dealing with moral questions there sometimes seems               
to be a trade-off between effort/costs and the desired result. I do not think that one should                 
dismiss the desired result as impossible just because it might be hard to reach. It is a cop out to                    
give up before one has started because it is too hard. It is also a mistake to try to do all at once, a                        
thousand mile journey begins with a single step. Mcmahan puts this well in the following quote:  
 
“But unlike political action, moral philosophy is not a matter of strategic            
calculation, manipulation, and compromise. Its aim, as I conceive it, is to discover             
the truth about matters of morality. If we are ultimately to act in conformity with               
the real demands of morality, we must know whether we have moral reason to try               
to reduce the incidence of predation or perhaps even to eliminate it, if that              
becomes possible. The fact that the vast majority of people worldwide would now             
find it preposterous to suppose that we have such a reason provides little reason to               
suppose that they are right, just as the uniformity of opinion about the ethics of               
slavery among whites in the antebellum South provided little reason for supposing            
that it can be permissible to kidnap and enslave other people.” (The Moral             
Problem of Predation p. 4)  
 
Moral progress is an important aspect of the aim of moral philosophy. Progress in general is                
often demanding and takes effort. To care about the well-being of animals in the wild will                
require more of us than what we are doing right now, but that should not be a reason to shirk                    
certain obligations that comes with being moral agents. As mentioned earlier in the text, it might                
be useful to regard certain moral obligations which are especially burdensome as Sapontzis calls              
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it “useful moral ideal” . It might be near impossible to realize these ideals but we should still                 55
strive to get closer to them.  
None of the arguments above give us definitive reason to ignore wild animal suffering and to                
exclude wild animals from the sphere of moral considerability. In many cases the supposed              
disagreement and dissension between environmentalists and animal welfarists poses no practical           
problems. If one argues that we ought to intervene in nature in cases such as disease or disaster                  
relief, there is little tension between the two views. In fact, many projects have been undertaken                
to aid animals and certain species with the aim of preservation and environmental aims. This can                
be done with the aim of preservation or promotion of well-being or both at the same time. So,                  
there is common ground for the two views and one can argue for conjoined efforts based on                 
correlations in nature that would suggest an interest both in nature and in individual well-being.               
For example a study published in PNAS by Ceballos et al shows that population of wildlife is                 56 57
decreasing and that this has negative effects on ecosystems as a whole. The issues seems to lie in                  
how far we ought to go. Meddling in predation would be going too far according to                
environmentalists while that is not necessarily so for animal welfarists. 
 
4.2 Is Preventing Predation Futile? 
As mentioned, predation poses a particular problem to minimizing disvalue in nature. The             
abolishment of predation often gets written off as a pipe dream. Considering how widespread              
predation is, a project to just minimize it easily comes across as futile. There are three main ways                  
of looking at the problem of predation:  
1. We weigh the wellbeing of the predators versus that of their prey and conclude that the overall                  
value gained outweighs the disvalue. This might be hard to show. It seems that the relative gain                 
in wellbeing for the predator does not outweigh the suffering and death of its prey. Especially                
since the gain is only temporary and the predator soon has to kill and feed again to survive. 
2. One might argue that predation does contribute more to disvalue than value in nature and that                 
we ought to remedy this for an overall better world. However, there is no feasible way to do this                   
and it seems unlikely that there will be one in the foreseeable future. Due to this, we might argue                   
that we do have obligations to aid animals that suffer from for example curable diseases or                
starvation where we can provide food, but that it is too much to ask of us to put a stop to                     
predation. This is a conclusion based on pragmatic reasons. 
3. We argue that we ought to do what we can to, in fact, put an end to predation in nature. This is                       
a rather radical stance since the most feasible way to do this with current methods would be to                  
55 Sapontzis 1984 
56 Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the United States of America. 
57 Ceballos, Ehrlich, Dirzo 2017 
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exterminate predators. This can be done painlessly by sterilization and would take some time but               
ultimately it could be done. This option, however, strikes me as too grand of an idea and comes                  
with many issues. To consider all the different consequences of exterminating a species is              
extremely difficult. There is also a problem with how the food chain works to keep populations                
in check. If predators diminish and go away, we can expect a rise in numbers of other species                  
that would create new problems with resources. Then mankind will have the task of controlling               
population so that they do not exceed the limit of sustainability. If we are to entertain this notion                  
we need to be incredibly careful and research all the possible outcomes meticulously before              
taking action.  
If the minimization of predation seems futile with the technology we currently possess, maybe 
that is not where we ought to focus our efforts. If our aim is maximize well-being or at least 
minimize suffering. Where can this be done most effectively? Where can we do most good? As 
stated earlier, studies have shown that in today’s world, wild mammals only make out a small 
part of the total amount of living beings. Is this were we ought to focus our efforts? Maybe we 
could improve the total aggregated well-being more if we improve the lives of domesticated 
animals and humans. This could be a strong argument for where we should focus our efforts and 
that in fact wild animals is not the point of focus. Wild animals still matter in the same sense as 
domesticated but their numbers are fewer and therefore less impactful in the overall picture.  
 
4.3 Three Animals and Three Intuitions 
I think we have different intuitions in different cases and it would therefore be helpful to try and 
clarify these since they might serve as ground for how we chose to act. I shall try to illustrate this 
with the following argument from analogy.  
 
If I came across another person in distress, say he or she has been in an accident, and I am 
capable of aiding him/her, most of us would agree that I ought to help. The very least I could do 
would be to call for help so he or she gets taken care of. This is because this person is a sentient 
being who at the moment is in pain and is suffering. With aid, his/her suffering could be 
alleviated. If I were to simply ignore his/her condition even though I am capable of improving it 
most, if not all, of us would say that what I did was wrong.  
 
If we use the same example and switch the person with an animal, our intuitions might change. If 
the animal that is suffering is some kind of domesticated animal, let’s say a pet of some sort, 
most of us would probably say that we ought to act and aid the pet. To do otherwise would be 
wrong.  
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    But what if I find a bird, a wild animal, with an injured wing on my Sunday walk or in my 
garden? This bird is clearly in pain and is suffering. Is it reasonable to argue that I should try to 
aid this bird and alleviate its pain? I believe so. In fact I think most of us would want to aid the 
bird somehow when it is sitting there on the ground in front of us clearly in need.  
Then what about animals in the wild? Say that the same bird is no longer in my neighborhood                   
but in the vast wilderness, but equally injured and equally destitute. Does this change our               
intuitions? Our obligations? Our reasoning? One injured bird somewhere in nature is of course a               
straw in a haystack and how are we supposed to know it is in need and even more so how are we                      
to find it and help it? But let’s take a more obvious example: there is an unusually harsh drought                   
on the savanna in Kenya. Animals are suffering from dehydration and are starting to succumb to                
the heat. We can keep track of this since we have noticed the drought ourselves. We have water                  
supplies so we are not in any immediate danger but there are more and more evidence that the                  
animals in the wild need aid, this evidence comes in the form of dead animals. We could start a                   
rescue and relief project where we would pump water to the local waterhole where the animals                
come in search of water. Is this something we should do? Would it be wrong not to act? What                   
does intuition tell us?  
Even if one did not live anywhere near the drought and therefore did not experience the                 
intense heat or witness the corpses of the animals that succumb to it, one could still help. If a                   
project was started to provide wild animals with water in this time of need and it would need                  
funding. Should one donate to such a project? Could it be argued that one is obliged to                 58
contribute? This might be contested but it might be difficult for the opponent to come up with                 
convincing arguments for their contention. Based on the fact that the animals suffering are              
sentient beings and that we could alleviate their suffering, then we ought to do this in order                 
minimize suffering. The best way to proceed can be discussed, perhaps this is something that               
should be handled by the government or certain specially created organisations. The point is, if               
our intuition tells us we ought to help the pet and we have a similar intuition regarding the                  
injured bird, then we ought to help the wild animals suffering in the drought as well.  
 
4.4 Action  
 
The argument from analogy seems to provide us with reason to intervene in nature to aid                
suffering animals. This argument draws its force from intuition in cases that are equal when               
considered rationally. I believe this argument supports the claim that we do have moral              
obligation towards wild animals. However, there is one more aspect that needs to be considered               
if one wishes to go a step further and claim that we should intervene in nature. Such a claim is                    
ultimately stating that we should carry out certain acts. Even if a moral obligation can be                
58 There is in fact such a project today driven by Patrick Kilonzo Mwalua. He delivers water to wild animals 
in times of drought and has a gofundme page to raise money for his project.  
https://www.gofundme.com/tsavoelephantguardian 
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established one can still ask whether an act that intervenes in nature is the right one. The                 
argument from analogy gives us a moral obligation but would intervention be the right act? This                
is a question that requires one to take a normative stance and commit to a normative theory.                 
Previously in this text many examples have been considered from a consequentialist view and              
this is not a coincidence. It is common for animal welfarists to subscribe to consequentialism of                
some form since what they value is the subjective experience of good. This is also the criteria for                  
the rightness of an act according to classical consequentialism, an act is right if it brings about                 
the best possible consequences, i.e. that which creates the most good. What would             
consequentialism say in the case of intervention in nature then? The badness of pain and the fact                 
that vertebrates are sentient beings able to have good or bad experience give us reason to                
intervene, but would it be the right action according to consequentialism? Before one tries to               
answer this we need to distinguish between positive and negative consequentialism since they             
are likely to reach different conclusion.  
Positive consequentialism is concerned with maximizing the good. I have previously defined             
the good as well-being, essentially, meaning good experiences. Considering the suffering present            
in nature one might hastily draw the conclusion that we ought to intervene and not only try to                  
alleviate this suffering but also actively do something to increase the amount of well-being              
sentient animals experience. This could be done in many ways, such as, building shelters, putting               
out feed or creating organisations that deal with animal disaster relief.  
This might seems straightforward enough. However, positive consequentialism also seems to            
give unwanted results when aggregation is considered. One of the most famous examples of this               
is Parfit’s repugnant conclusion. Parfit reached the conclusion that: “For any possible population             
of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger                    
imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better even though its               
members have lives that are barely worth living” (Parfit 1984). This is a serious challenge since                
it seems overall counterintuitive.  
Would negative consequentialism fare any better? If we assert that it is not the maximization                
of the good that is the aim, rather it is the reduction of the bad, suffering in this case; do we get a                       
more plausible path? Again there are many options available to alleviate suffering among             
sentient beings in nature, but it seems that negative consequentialism also run into counter              
intuitive conclusions, such as exterminating all animals in the wild. One could argue that if there                
were no animals then there would be no suffering and this would be the best possible world. The                  
reasoning would be that if the conditions in nature are so awful, then not existing would be                 
preferable. If we are not to completely eradicate wild animals as a whole then at least maybe we                  
ought to painlessly euthanize those who suffer. A way to oppose this line of reasoning is to argue                  
for death as an extrinsic harm. It seems incompatible to argue that we should end the lives of                  
animals to spare them harm if we by doing so would harm them by robbing them of future                  
possible good. Then again, a negative consequentialist might not value any such good and              
therefore oppose this line of reasoning. One could also consider mankind confining wild animals              
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and make sure that their needs are seen to so that they live good lives. Maybe the                 
consequentialist view can be modified in some way to escape counter intuitive conclusion such              
as the ones mentioned above, but if one were to reach the conclusion that consequentialism is not                 
a favorable theory for arguing for intervention nature then what are the alternatives? One could               
turn to other normative theories based on rights or care, or consider a welfare state for wild                 
animals. To find the most suitable normative theory for the advocation of intervention in nature               
will be a philosophical project for the future. For now, it is possible to argue that the argument                  
from analogy gives us sufficient reason in itself. It is enough to show that we do have obligations                  
towards wild animals and this makes it plausible to argue that an act that fulfills that obligation is                  
the right one. If aggregation and maximization of the good lead to counterintuitive results but we                
can affirm a strong intuition in the argument from analogy this is enough to criticise today’s                
anthropocentrism.  
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5. Conclusion  
Should we intervene in nature to prevent suffering in the wild? It seems so. After all, intervention 
in nature is not a completely new idea. Vaccination or conservation programs are not foreign 
ideas. There are many examples of such programs taking place in today’s world. Such examples 
of possible intervention show that there are ways we can aid and benefit wild animals. The view 
that intervention in nature is futile can be somewhat countered by showing that it is very possible 
to make a meaningful and concrete difference for the well-being of wild animals. On top of that, 
it seems to be our intuitive reaction to care about sentient beings that are suffering. Most of us 
would, when finding a bird with an injured wing, pick it up and try to help it in some way. 
The thesis of this text is rather cautious. I claim that if one accepts sentience as a baseline for 
moral considerability, we do have moral obligations towards wild animals (as well as 
domesticated ones). The normative and epistemological starting points for this text suggest we 
ought to, at the very least, consider wild animals in the overall moral calculation. This seems 
clear regarding vertebrates. In order to pinpoint our moral obligations it is essential to affirm 
what beings are sentient in a relevant manner. Therefore, it is a crucial task for scientist to 
continue their research in this field in the future. This will ultimately determine what beings are 
within our moral scope. As it stands today, I believe that for now we should focus on aiding 
vertebrates. This is because we can establish that they are sentient in a relevant sense and 
therefore matter morally. That is not to say that invertebrates do not matter at all. Whether they 
are sentient in a relevant sense requires more research. If they prove to be sentient that may very 
well change everything since invertebrates outnumber vertebrates in nature. However, in order to 
make meaningful strides we need to start somewhere and I believe we can make a real impactful 
change to the well-being of vertebrates.  
 
The topic of intervention in nature on moral grounds will have widespread consequences for us 
as moral agents and on society as a whole, depending on what conclusion is reached. We might 
be heading towards a future where the circle of our moral considerations is wider and will 
include all sentient beings. This would mean that there will be a heavier moral responsibility to 
shoulder. In present time we can find many practical problems with intervention in nature and 
some argue that it would not be feasible. There are limitations to what we can achieve with 
current methods and knowledge but that is not to say it is hopeless. There is a lot we can already 
do and with research there will be even more we can achieve in the future.  
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